Constitutional justice, judicial discretion and principialism
Abstract
The discussion about who should be the defender of the Constitution is a classic question in constitutional justice as important as the question about how should act that defender. This article aims to address the question of whether it is possible to dispense with the thesis of discretion in constitutional justice. For this purpose, a review of the discussion between Kelsen-Hart is done, to then carry out an evaluation of the thesis of judicial discretion against the principlist theories of Dworkin and Alexy about the law and on how the defender of the Constitution should act.
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Revista de la Facultad de Derecho. Creative Commons Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional License.
