Legal Theory and Moral Philosophy
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to raise the hypothesis that, in its current state, according to the metaethical grounds that explicitly or implicitly sustain any interesting conception of the law, legal theory can be conceived as (a part of) moral philosophy. This hypothesis is inferred from two questions that is worth asking to any legal theorist: 1) Is there an objective morality? 2) Which is the relevance of the answer to the preceding question for the conceptual and normative ways through which it is possible to provide an account of law as a social practice?
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