O ideal de autonomia moral
Resumo
Neste ensaio apresento alguns elementos constitutivos do ideal de autonomia moral, que é um pressuposto central das práticas sociais com foco na imputação normativa, fundamentalmente na moral e no direito. Partindo de uma conceição construtivista da normatividade, tomo como elemento essencial e não redutível às razões, e focalizo-me nos aspectos conceituais que caracterizam as razões morais dentro do domínio normativo.
Posteriormente, desenvolvo uma idéia da autonomia moral baseada na auto-constituição que inclui três propriedades fundamentais: a possibilidade de responder a razões fundadas em expectativas sociais compartilhadas; a responsabilidade por determinado âmbito de ações, segundo o conjunto de razões que dispõe o sujeito e até o ponto em que ele possa ampliá-las, e a necessidade de preservar a autonomia como finalidade que unifica o conjunto de ações autônomas dos agentes morais.
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