The value of omissions in terms of responsibility: an analysis from the theory of action. Reflections from the case of tax responsibility
Abstract
This article addresses the problem of omissions and its impact in the field of responsibility theory. It problematizes around how omissions challenge the concept of causality and when we can say that a person is morally responsible for their omissions. Based on the inputs provided by the theory of action and the theory of moral responsibility, the tax jurisprudence in matters of legal responsibility of representatives and attorneys in fact is analyzed. It is concluded that the conceptual complexity presented by the omissions has resulted in the TCA not contemplating them when attributing responsibility, when, instead and in what is pertinent, they should be assigned the same weight as a genuine action.
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Revista de la Facultad de Derecho. Creative Commons Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional License.