The Idea of a Democratic Authority
Abstract
Does an organized society have the right to prescribe rules of conduct that create for the citizen a moral duty of compliance with them and can be enforced coercitivily? Is Democracy special about the justification of that right? To answer affirmatively both questions requires to formulate, as a regulative ideal of Democracy, a proposal of justification of Democratic Authority. A conception of Democratic Authority has to give an argument that overcome the basic objections against political authority, paradigmatically posed by philosophical anarchism. And must do it in a way that the justification of authority be specifically democratic, that is to say, showing that the decision procedure under conditions of political equality is able to serve the citizen in a specific manner, not available to any other form of exercising political power. The purposes of this paper are to make explicit some theoretical problem of Democracy as political authority, to pose comparatively some of the most influent contemporary proposals of justification and to conclude with a basic idea of Democratic Authority.
Downloads
References
Arneson, R. J. (2004). Democracy is not intrinsically just. En Dowding, K., Goodin, R. y Pateman, C. (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barry, B. (2003). Is Democracy Special?. En Christiano, T. (ed.), Philosophy and Democracy. An Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Christiano, T.(2004). The Authority of Democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12(3), 266-290.
Christiano, T.( (2006). Democracy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Zalta, E.(ed.). Disponible en <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/2006/entries/democracy/>.
Christiano, T.( (2010). The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cunningham, F. (2002). Theories of Democracy. A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge.
Dworkin, R. (2000). Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Emmet, D. (1994). The Role of the Unrealizable. A Study in Regulative Ideals. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Estlund, D. (2008). Democratic Authority, A philosophical Framework. Princenton: Princenton University Press.
Gaus, G. (1991). Public Justification and Democratic Adjudication. Constitutional Political Economy, 2(3), 251-281.
Gaus, G. (1997). Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can’t Have It All. En Bohman, J. y Regh, W., Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. New York: Cambridge University Press.Gauss, G. F. (2000). Political Concepts and Political Theories. Colorado: WestviewPress.
Gaus, G. F (2003). Contemporaries Theories of Liberalism. London: Sage Publications.
González Ricoy, I. (2010). Reseña de Estlund, David. Democratic Authority. Aphilosophical Framework. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericanade Filosofía, UNAM, 42(124),118-125.
Goodin, R. (2005). Reflective Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Green, L. (1988). The Authority of the State. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The Concept of Law (2ª ed.). New York: Clarendon Press.
Hershovitz, S. (2012). The Authority of Law. En Marmor, A. (ed.), The RoutledgeCompanion to Philosophy of Law. New York: Routledge.
Huemer, M. (2013). The Problem of Political Authority. New York: PalgraveMacmillan.
Hobbes, T.(2010) [1651] Leviathan. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hurd, H. (1991). Challenging Authority. The Yale Law Journal, 100(6), 1611-1617.
King, C. S. (2012). Problems in the Theory of Democratic Authority. Ethical Theoryand Moral Practice, (15), 431-448.
Ladeson, R. (1990). In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law. En Raz, J.(ed.), Authority. New York: New York University Press.
Locke, J. (1946) [1680]. The Second Treatise of Government. New York: TheMacmillan Company.
Marquisio, R. (2013). Democracia: concepto, concepciones y justificación normativa. Revista de la Facultad de Derecho, (34), 97-122.
Marquisio, R. (2014). Una teoría normativa de la democracia. La agencia colectivacomo ideal regulativo. Montevideo: FHCE.
Martí, J. L. (2006). La república deliberativa. Una teoría de la democracia.Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ovejero, F. (2008). Incluso en un pueblo de demonios: democracia, liberalismo,republicanismo. Madrid: Katz.
Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (1990a). Introduction. En Raz, J. (ed.), Authority. New York: New YorkUniversity Press.
Raz, J. (1990b). Authority and Justification. En Raz, J. (ed.), Authority. New York:New York University Press.
Raz, J. (1994). Ethics in the Public Domain. New York: Oxford University Press.Shapiro, I. (2010). Reading Hobbes Today. Introducción a Hobbes, Thomas,Leviathan Or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticalland Civil. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Raz, J. (2002). Authority. En Coleman, J. & Shapiro, S. (eds.), The OxfordHandbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford UniversityPress.
Simmons, J. (1981). Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princenton: PrincentonUniversity Press.
Wolff, R. P. (1998). In Defence of Anarchism, (2º ed.). New York: Harper and Row.
Zagzbsky, L. T. (2012). Epistemic Authority. A Theory of Trust, Authority and Autonomy in Belief. New York: Oxford University Press.
This journal provides open access to its content, based on the principle that providing the public with free access to research helps a greater global exchange of knowledge
Revista de la Facultad de Derecho. Creative Commons Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional License.
