El ideal de autonomía moral
Resumen
En este ensayo planteo algunos elementos constitutivos del ideal de autonomía moral, que resulta un presupuesto central de las prácticas sociales centradas en la imputación normativa, fundamentalmente la moral y el derecho. Parto de una concepción constructivista de la normatividad, tomando como elemento esencial y no reductible a las razones, y me centro en los rasgos conceptuales que caracterizan a las razones morales dentro del dominio normativo. Posteriormente, desarrollo una idea de la autonomía moral basada en la auto-constitución que incluye tres propiedades fundamentales: la posibilidad de responder a razones fundadas en expectativas sociales compartidas; la responsabilidad por cierto ámbito de acciones, según el conjunto de razones de que dispone el sujeto y hasta el punto en que pueda ampliarlas, y la necesidad de conservar la autonomía como finalidad que unifica el conjunto de acciones autónomas de los agentes morales.
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